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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether the nature of gender relations matters for the effects on household 
efficiency of exogenous variation in spousal control over the intra-household allocation of 
resources. Experiments testing for efficiency were conducted among married couples in eight 
sites representing a range of conjugal cultures: from an extreme form of separate spheres in 
northern Nigeria to (male) centralised control in North India, along with a variety of intermediate 
cases. Inefficiency is widespread, varies greatly and tends to be lower when wives control the 
allocation. The exception is a site in northern Nigeria where female control over resources is well 
established. 
 
Key words: intra-household efficiency; spousal control; experiments; India; Ethiopia; Nigeria 
 
JEL Classification: D13, J12, J16, O15 
  
                                                 
1 We thank Vegard Iversen for initial discussions; Cecile Jackson, Andreas Kutka, Dominique Lussier and 
Nitya Rao for comments and for help in identifying literature to guide our site selection; for institutional 
support for the fieldwork Dr Assefa Admassie, Director of the Ethiopian Economics Association, Prof. 
Amaresh Dubey, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Dr Haruna Wakilli, Director of 
Mammbayya House, Centre for Democratic Research & Training, Kano, Nigeria; for organising and 
implementing data collection our fieldwork manager, Matthew Osborne, supervisors Dr Andreia Miraldo 
(Ethiopia and Nigeria), Dr Joe Hill (Ethiopia), Kabiru Bello (Nigeria), Dr Biswarupa Gosh, Dr Pradip K. 
Sen, and Dr Anup K. Mishra (Uttar Pradesh), Dr R. Naagarajan (Tamil Nadu) and all local research 
assistants; for helpful comments participants in seminars at the Chief Economist’s Office at the Department 
for International Development (DFID), UK and in a CBESS/BEDERG seminar at the University of East 
Anglia, UK; for the joint grant (RES-167-25-0251) UK’s ESRC and DFID. 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
A central question in economics is whether households are efficient in their resource 
allocation decisions.2 In unitary and collective models of the household, efficiency is a 
model outcome or assumption, whereas in some cooperative bargaining models and all 
non-cooperative models, efficiency is not guaranteed.3 In these models, when household 
members have divergent preferences, coordination failures may result in inefficiency.4 
The desire to exert individual control over the intra-household allocation of resources is 
thus a potentially important determinant of its inefficiency. In this study, we investigate 
what happens to the efficiency of intra-household resource allocation in response to 
exogenous variation of control over that allocation, using lab-in-the-field experiments. 
We selected eight sites in three countries to represent typical gender relations: from 
unified households in North India to households in northern Nigeria resembling 
households in non-cooperative models, along with a variety of intermediate cases. For 
selecting these sites, we made extensive use of ethnographies that document a region’s 
conjugality, i.e. typical salient features of spousal relations. 
 In each of the eight sites purposively selected on conjugality, we conducted identical 
variants of a public goods game, using a voluntary contribution mechanism. Husbands 
and wives would each choose to divide an individual endowment between a private 
account and a joint account – the common pot. Money deposited in the common pot 
earned 50 per cent interest, so is akin to contributing to a household public good. Any 
money deposited in the private account represents allocative (Kaldor-Hicks) inefficiency: 
the interest that could have been earned and made both spouses better off is forfeited. 
 We then manipulated the control of resources by making either the husband or the 
wife in charge of the allocation of the common pot. In addition to the base version of the 
public goods game, we thus have two treatments, which we implemented in a between-
subject design. The questions that this design enables us to answer are (a) does the 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper, we mean by efficiency that of the Kaldor-Hicks variety: a shift of resources could 
bring about a situation in which those who gain are in a position to compensate those who lose. In other 
words, it leads to conceivable Pareto improvements. 
3 See for instance the survey of this literature in Apps and Rees, 2009. 
4 Possible inefficiency results from individual utility maximisation subject to individual budget constraints 
in non-cooperative models, and from the endogeneity of bargaining power as well as time inconsistency in 
cooperative models; see Section 2.1 for a brief account. 
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efficiency of intra-household resource allocation respond to which spouse controls the 
allocation, and (b) does the response vary across different local conjugal cultures? 
 In answering these questions, we fill a gap in the literature. Much of the evidence for 
the claim that spousal control is a determinant of inefficiency is for West African farm 
households, in which husbands and wives pursue separate economic activities and seem 
to fail to take mutually beneficial resource allocation decisions (Jones, 1983; Udry, 1996; 
Akresh, 2008) or insure each other completely (Duflo and Udry, 2004). The studies cited 
are based on surveys collecting naturally occurring data. A limitation of most evidence 
based on naturally occurring data is that it may suffer from omitted variables bias. Such 
bias is exceedingly difficult to avoid however carefully plot characteristics and other 
potential confounds are controlled for. For example, the often cited study by Udry (1996) 
for Burkina Faso did not control for fallow duration, which is very important in the 
farming systems in that country and the omission of which in the analysis could drive the 
reported result of apparent inefficiency (cf. Goldstein and Udry, 2008).5  
 We used lab-in-the-field experiments in which spousal control over the allocation of 
resources is exogenously altered, which side-steps the problem of omitted variables bias. 
We thus contribute to the burgeoning literature that uses lab-in-the-field experiments to 
investigate the efficiency of married couples’ resource allocation decisions. Some studies 
have simply investigated whether or not such decisions are efficient, without 
implementing treatments designed to identify sources of inefficiency. Castilla (2015), 
using a trust game among married couples in India, finds that on average only 57 per cent 
of endowments are sent, with 97 per cent of married couples failing to reach the socially 
efficient outcome. Cochard et al. (2015), in a sample of married and co-habiting couples 
from France, find in a prisoner’s dilemma game that one in four couples do not achieve 
the mutually beneficial resource allocation. 
 Other experimental studies have looked at sources of inefficiency using treatments. 
One source of inefficiency considered in these studies is asymmetric information. Mani 
(2011) among married couples in India finds widespread inefficiency when spouses 
                                                 
5 When omitted variables bias is ruled out, in a natural field experiment in Mexico in which women’s 
income was varied randomly as part of an evaluation of the PROGRESA programme, the evidence favours 
the interpretation that husbands and wives are efficient in their resource allocation decisions (Bobonis, 
2009; Attanasio and Lechene, 2014). Clearly, Mexico is not in West Africa and a natural field experiment 
not always feasible in a site that is of research interest. 
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choose between investment options in which personal control is obtained at the expense 
of household income; however, when she experimentally manipulates access to 
information about spousal choices, this does not affect efficiency. In another 
experimental study that manipulates access to information, Hoel (2015) in a sample of 
married couples from Kenya finds a heterogeneous response to spouses observing each 
other’s choices. In a dictator game in which tokens are worth 20 Kenyan shillings if kept 
and 30 if donated to one’s spouse, about half of subjects are not affected by whether or 
not their decisions are made in secret, whereas 36 per cent give less in secret and 14 per 
cent give more. Munro et al. (2014) among married couples in India find in a public 
goods game that when endowments are public knowledge, female contributions but not 
male contributions are higher compared to a variant of the game in which endowments 
are known by the individual spouse alone.6 
 The main other source of inefficiency considered in experimental studies among 
married couples is spousal control.7 One influential study strongly suggests that spousal 
control matters for the efficiency of intra-household allocation of resources but does not 
causally establish it (as that was not the study’s primary aim). Ashraf (2009) among 
clients of a rural bank in the Philippines and their spouses offered experimental subjects 
the choice between depositing an endowment in an account (either a private account or a 
joint/the spouse’s account) and consuming the money (received as a gift certificate or 
cash). In an auxiliary treatment, she finds that 21 per cent of subjects sacrifice cash in 
order to ensure that it went to an account of their choosing. The motive of gaining control 
over the cash is plausible, but was not experimentally investigated.  
 Other experimental studies have directly investigated spousal control as a source of 
inefficiency. Each of these have used a public goods game with a voluntary contribution 
mechanism, in which spousal control is altered experimentally in a between-subject 
design. Iversen et al. (2011) among married couples in Uganda finds that both male and 
female contributions (and thus efficiency) go up when wives control the allocation of the 
                                                 
6 In experimentally manipulated exogenous shocks to spouses’ income among married couples in Ghana, 
Castilla and Walker (2013) find that the visibility of these shocks affects their use: public shocks translate 
into more household expenditures, whereas private shocks into more in-kind gifts (husbands) and savings 
(wives). As they acknowledge, they cannot be certain that this is evidence of inefficiency. 
7 Other sources of inefficiency looked at in lab-in-the-field studies among married couples are whether 
private resources are worked for, so earned rather than simply received (Munro et al., 2014), and whether 
budgets are separate or single (Lopez et al., 2015).  
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common pot, whereas Kebede et al. (2014) in Ethiopia and Munro et al. (2014) in India 
find that male and female contributions, when they do respond, go down when wives are 
in charge of the allocation. Husbands controlling the allocation has no effect on 
contributions in the three studies cited. 
 Our contribution to the literature is to examine the effect of spousal control on 
efficiency systematically across a range of purposively selected local conjugal cultures. 
We have no variation across our eight sites in experimental design and implementation, 
randomly assign couples to treatment in each site (we control for inadvertent selection 
too), and using survey data, we corroborate our motives for site selection. Differences in 
treatment effects across sites should thus be due to differences in spousal relations across 
sites. 
We find that female plus male contributions to the common pot in the experiments 
range from 47 per cent of endowments to 64 per cent, implying inefficiency of 12 – 18 
per cent. Contributions are highest in urban North India, lowest in our two West African 
sites, and in between those two extremes in our other sites. Broadly speaking, the more 
separate decision-making is in real life, the lower spousal contributions are to the 
common pot in the experiments.  
 Wives controlling the allocation of the common pot has a large number of robust 
treatment effects. It lowers female contributions in two sites, raises female contributions 
in one site, lowers male contributions in two sites, and lowers efficiency (male plus 
female contributions) in four sites. By contrast, husbands controlling the allocation of the 
common pot has no robust treatment effects: not on female contributions, not on male 
contributions, and not on efficiency. This contrast between many, generally negative 
effects of wives’ control of the allocation on male and female contributions on the one 
hand, and no such effects of husbands’ control on the other hand is striking. We think this 
may be because husbands’ control over the allocation of household resources is the norm 
in most of our sites, for which we present survey evidence. For that reason, giving wives 
such control in the experiments may be unsettling, for both spouses, which causes them 
to lower their contributions. Indeed, in the one site where giving wives control of the 
allocation raises female contributions (among the Hausa in northern Nigeria), female 
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control over resources is well-established in daily life: women are from their homesteads 
very active, financially independent traders (see Section 3.1). 
 In regression analysis we find that expectations of spousal contributions are an 
important determinant of own contributions. We also find that in the (relatively rare 
cases) when wives control household finances in real life, husband contributions to the 
common pot in the experiments go up. The last-mentioned finding provides an interesting 
contrast with Ashraf (2009)’s findings for the Philippines, which we discuss in the paper 
in terms of the markedly lower responsibility for financial management that women have 
in our sites compared to the Philippines. 
 We see as our main finding that existing spousal relations interact with effects on 
household efficiency of altering spousal control over the intra-household allocation of 
resources. The implication for policy that we take from the contrasting treatment effects 
we find is that attempts to influence wives’ control over intra-household resource 
allocation may be unsettling and may therefore – in the cases of friction with existing 
norms – cause spouses to reduce their contributions to the household (become more 
private and less joint) at least until new norms are properly established. In theoretical 
terms, such interventions may increase the likelihood of an inefficient separate spheres 
equilibrium, as opposed to the efficient income pooling one (cf. Lechene and Preston, 
2011). 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present theoretical considerations, our 
experimental design and the framework for the analysis. In Section 3, we motivate site 
selection in terms of the ethnographic record and describe the fieldwork implementation. 
In Section 4 subject characteristics are presented, followed by information on assignment 
to treatment and balancing tests, and an analysis of behaviour in the games first without 
and then conditioning on socio-economic characteristics. In Section 5 we summarise our 
findings, compare them with the related literature, and spell out implications for theory 
and policy. Section 6 contains a brief conclusion. 
 
2. Theory and experimental design 
In this section we first sketch in Section 2.1 how inefficiency of intra-household resource 
allocation may arise in economic models of the household, and then present in Section 
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2.2 the experiments designed to test for a particular source (spousal control) of 
inefficiency, followed in Section 2.3 by the framework for the analysis. 
 
2.1 Inefficiency of intra-household allocation of resources in economic theory 
The notion of efficiency tested for in this study is that of the Kaldor-Hicks variety: a shift 
of resources could bring about a situation in which those who gain are in a position to 
compensate those who lose. In other words, when a shift of resources is possible that 
leads to conceivable Pareto improvements, then Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has not been 
attained. Economic models of the household differ radically in terms of possible 
inefficiency and its sources. In unified models of the household (a representative example 
is Becker, 1974), centralised control ensures efficiency. By contrast, in non-cooperative 
models, introduced by Ulph (1988) and Woolley (1988), efficiency is not guaranteed. 
Central to these models is individual utility maximisation subject to individual budget 
constraints, with interdependence of decisions resulting from household public goods and 
caring preferences. Consumption and production decisions are not necessarily optimally 
coordinated and household public goods may be underprovided, the more so when 
exiting the marriage is easier.  
In between these two extremes, there are the collective models introduced by 
Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988), which assume Pareto efficiency but 
do not contain much structure besides; and cooperative bargaining models. Some of the 
latter could be seen as collective models with some more structure imposed and the 
assumption of Pareto efficiency retained, such as the seminal cooperative bargaining 
models of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). In others, the 
Pareto property is satisfied that the household welfare function is strictly increasing in 
each member’s consumption but neither Pareto nor Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is necessarily 
attained. Reasons for inefficiency in cooperative models include feedback loops from 
anticipated shifts in the balance of power that result from contemplated household 
resource allocation decisions (Basu, 2006); and the inability to make binding agreements 
because spouses’ commitments are not renegotiation-proof (Lundberg and Pollak, 2003; 
Apps and Rees, 2009, pp. 81 ff.).  
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Interestingly, the realism of each main class of models is geographically restricted, for 
which ample ethnographic evidence exists (see Section 3.1). We selected sites in North 
India that resemble unified models of the household, sites in northern Nigeria that 
resemble non-cooperative models and sites in Ethiopia to typify relations between 
spouses that are essentially cooperative but with ample scope for mechanisms that 
preclude efficiency. In each site we test whether exogenously altering control over the 
intra-household allocation of resources (letting either the husband or the wife be in 
charge) matters for the efficiency of that allocation. Finding that resource allocation is 
inefficient would reject unified and collective models of the household. However, our 
main interest is in investigating how efficiency of resource allocation is affected by the 
local conjugal culture, the identity of the spouse in charge of allocation, and spousal 
control and conjugality interacted. Investigating this does not constitute a direct test of 
any particular model of the household. We see this investigation as exploratory and 
suggesting future developments of theory, in particular for non-cooperative models of the 
household and cooperative bargaining models that allow for inefficiency. We reflect on 
implications for theory in Section 5.3. 
 
2.2 Experimental design 
Married couples played variants of a public goods game (PGG) in a between-subject 
design. In the base of the PGG, each spouse receives endowment E, and then chooses an 
investment hI  (husband, wI  for wife) from the set  EEEE ,,,,0 432141 . The 
contributions to the common pot )( wh II   are then multiplied by 1.5 and distributed 
evenly between the two spouses who each receive )(75.0 wh II  .  
We have two treatments that each entail precisely one change from the base. In the 
first treatment, “female control”, the wife decides on the distribution of the common pot. 
Both spouses contribute to the common pot knowing that the wife will decide on its 
allocation, i.e. the wife will decide how much the husband receives and how much she 
herself receives. 
In the second treatment, “male control”, the husband decides on how the common pot 
is distributed, which both spouses know when they make their contribution decisions. 
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The other main design features are as follows. First, decision-making took place in 
private. Husbands and wives were escorted to separate rooms, and communicated their 
decisions orally to one of the research assistants, who recorded it for them.8 
Second, subjects were not informed about the precise size of their spouse’s 
endowment. We instead informed them about a range of monetary amounts in which their 
spouse’s endowment would fall. In practice, in the treatments considered in this paper, 
the amount of money received was always equal to the maximum amount in this range.  
We avoided deception through taking advantage of the fact that we simultaneously 
conducted other treatments in which subjects received a lower amount. So for example, 
in the “female control” treatment in Ethiopia, wives were told:  
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact amount will vary between 
people, but you will receive something between Birr 0 and Birr 40. [Show the envelope.] Your 
husband will receive a similar envelope and he will also receive an amount of money between Birr 0 
and Birr 40. He doesn’t know how much you have in your envelope and you won’t be told how 
much he has in his envelope.  
Since in treatments not considered in this paper the amount subjects received could 
indeed vary from Birr 0 to Birr 40, the information given here is correct. The reasons we 
wanted subjects to be uninformed about the precise amount their spouses had received 
were (a) to give them plausible deniability if they wanted to contribute less than the full 
amount, and (b) to mimic real-life conditions of intra-household resource allocation (see 
Section 3.1). 
Third, instructions were orally delivered and read out from a script. These scripts were 
identical in each of the eight sites. They were translated into the local language and then 
back-translated in order to check that the intended meanings had survived the process of 
translation. The experimental instructions as delivered to subjects in the “female control” 
treatment in Ethiopia are presented in the online appendix. Instructions for other 
treatments and other sites are straightforward adaptations of these appended instructions.9 
Fourth, and as detailed in Section 3.1, we selected eight sites purposively on 
conjugality. Within each site, couples were randomly assigned to treatment, but the sites 
themselves are thought of as further treatments: they are observable dimensions of 
                                                 
8 Since literacy levels are low in many of the sites (cf. Table 2) we could not ask subjects to write down 
their decisions. 
9 All scripts are available from the authors. 
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subject heterogeneity that we interacted ex ante with game manipulations (cf. List et al., 
2011, pp. 443 ff.).  
Fifth, monetary incentives were sufficient. Endowments were calibrated to be equal to 
twice the local daily wage for semi-skilled labour. 
Sixth, married couples were randomly assigned to treatments. Moreover, each 
treatment was played in every session, and each couple participated in one treatment only, 
i.e. in the base version of the game or in “female control” or in “male control”. 
 
2.3 Framework for the analysis 
The bulk of the analysis is simple comparison-of-means tests of investment 𝐼𝑝, 𝑝 = ℎ, 𝑤 
in the base version of the PGG, 𝑇0, and treatment 𝑇𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,2 in site 𝑆𝑗, 𝑗 = 0,1, … ,7. We 
use two-sample two-sided t-tests for these comparisons, and a non-parametric alternative, 
i.e. Mann-Whitney, to check for the influence of distributional assumptions on the test 
statistic. 
In order to control for inadvertent sub-sample heterogeneity and session-level 
influence on behaviour, we condition on control variables cX  in the estimation 
framework provided by Equation (1), whose parameters may differ between husbands 
and wives. 
 
ikjkjjj
c
iii TSSXI    ,00     (1) 
 
The focus of the analysis is on whether conditional on site S, treatment T varies in its 
effect on subject’s i  investment Ii (contribution to the common pot). There are three 
treatment dummies 𝑇𝑘 , including base version 𝑇0 , and eight site dummies 𝑆𝑗  with 𝑆0 
being the reference site. 0  is mean investment in reference site 0S  in the base version of 
the PGG, 
00  j  is mean investment in the base of the PGG in site j, and 
kjj ,00     is mean investment in treatment k in site j, conditioned on observed 
subject/couple characteristics cX .  The null hypothesis that treatment effects conditioned 
on cX  are uniform across sites, i.e. 𝜏𝑗,𝑘 = 0 ∀ 𝑗, 𝑘 is tested first using simple OLS of (1); 
next using tobit to check whether it matters that the dependent variable is left and right 
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censored; and finally using ordered probit to check whether it matters that the dependent 
variable is not continuous. 
i  is a person-specific unobserved effect, which may include unobserved features of 
the couple, with overall mean 0  and conditional means 0||  jk ST  . In the 
estimation, we cluster standard errors by session and correct for heteroscedasticity. 
 
3. Site selection and fieldwork implementation 
We next motivate site selection in terms of the ethnographic record and outline how the 
fieldwork was implemented. 
 
3.1 Encouraging variation in conjugality through purposive site selection 
For the purpose of this study, we needed adequate variation in conjugality and we have 
tried to achieve this by selecting sites that have divergent marital norms and practices in 
respects that are relevant for us. Specifically, we have purposively selected sites that 
according to ethnographic literature could be taken to resemble various economic models 
of the household. In unitary models of the household, control of resources is centralised. 
We selected sites in North India to exemplify this, with arranged marriages, practically 
no divorce and female subordination to the male household head (Dyson and Moore, 
1983; Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001). 
By contrast, in non-cooperative models, consumption and production decisions are not 
necessarily optimally coordinated, the more so when exiting the marriage is easier. West 
African farming households are often cited as examples of husbands and wives forming 
separate consumption and production units (e.g. Hill, 1975; Tambiah, 1989). We selected 
sites in northern Nigeria, with frequent divorce and intra-household spheres of economic 
activities clearly demarcated along gender lines, to resemble non-cooperative models 
(Hill, 1972; Jackson, 1978; Callaway, 1987; Pittin, 2002). 
In between the extremes of unitary and non-cooperative models, there are cooperative 
bargaining models. We selected sites in Ethiopia to typify relations between spouses that 
are essentially cooperative but with obvious and ample scope for mechanisms that 
preclude efficiency. Unlike the dominant pattern in West African farm households of 
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separate production units, the typical agricultural production system in Ethiopia is one of 
separate tasks for men and women in a joint agricultural enterprise (Seebens and Sauer, 
2007). However, women frequently undertake extra activities for additional income and 
men are responsible for selling crops: despite extensive consultation of husbands and 
wives on agricultural matters being common, evidence exists of spouses’ substantial 
hiding of income from each other (Frank, 1999). 
We thus selected sites that differ in terms of degree of separation of spouses in 
economic activities, with those in North India representing jointness, those in northern 
Nigeria separateness, and those in Ethiopia an intermediate regime. For more nuance, we 
added within-country contrasts and ended up with the following eight sites, each of which 
is denoted using a short acronym (e.g. UPR).  
In India, in addition to a rural site in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (UPR), we 
selected a southern rural site, in Tamil Nadu (TAM), to capture the greater female 
autonomy in the South compared to the North (Sopher, 1980; Miller, 1981; Dyson and 
Moore, 1983; Jejeebhoy, 2001; Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001; Agnihotri et al., 2002) and 
therefore scope for separate activities.   
In northern Nigeria, in the Emirate of Kano, we selected the Hausa (HAU) people, 
whose women, despite female seclusion, are from their homesteads very active traders, 
highly independent and involved in activities entirely separate from those of their 
husbands, with whom they have a transactional relationship that often involves monetary 
payments (Hill, 1969, 1972; Jackson, 1978; Schildkrout, 1982; Callaway, 1987; Pittin, 
2002). In contrast, we also selected in the same part of Nigeria a site where pre-Muslim 
Hausa, the Maguzawa (MAG), reside, albeit in dwindling numbers (Clough, 2009). 
Among them, a wife is typically given a plot to cultivate by her husband, but also joins 
him to work on the gandu (ancestral land), along with his married sons and their wives 
(Greenberg, 1946; Abdulwahid, 2006). Separation is thus not nearly as extreme among 
the Maguzawa as it is among the Hausa.  
In Ethiopia, we sought to achieve a similar contrast in rural sites in terms of relative 
female involvement in the household’s farm, to capture degree of separation of spouses in 
economic activities, based on the broadly accurate pattern of a larger female agricultural 
role in plough than in hoe economies (Boserup, 1970; Alesina et al., 2011). Representing 
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plough economies and thus a greater degree of separation between spouses is our rural 
site of Mehal Meda (MHM), in the north of the country, and the hoe economies that of 
Hadiya (HAD), in the south.  
Finally, to capture a potential dilution of traditional contrasts under the influence of 
modernity, we selected two urban sites, one in India, Varanasi (VAR) in Uttar Pradesh 
(so in the same state as our rural site in North India) and the other the capital of Ethiopia, 
Addis Ababa (ADI). 
 
3.2 Sample selection and fieldwork implementation 
The details of sample selection and fieldwork implementation in each of our eight sites 
are presented in detail in Kebede et al (2014), Munro et ( 2010), (2014). Here we briefly 
summarise them. With the help of key informants, we purposively selected in every site a 
typical region (e.g. a district) and in every region five clusters of villages (wards in urban 
areas) in which game sessions could be organised, sufficiently far apart to avoid cross-
contamination.  
In each cluster, we took a census of all married couples, which provided us with a 
sampling frame. Couples were randomly selected and randomly replaced in case of non-
availability (which was rare), of which we kept a record. The total sample in our eight 
sites consisted of 3,068 married couples, of which 965 couples were randomly assigned 
to the treatments considered in this paper (see Section 4.2).  
For each treatment played in a site we thus had five sessions (one per cluster), and 
across all sites, eight sites times five sessions equals forty sessions in total.  
In the weeks that followed a game session, a survey was administered among all 
husbands and wives who participated in the experiments. Both spouses were interviewed, 
each by a separate interviewer and with the other spouse not present whenever possible 
(we recorded who were present during the interview). Husbands and wives were asked an 
overlapping but distinct set of questions about their socio-economic characteristics, role 
in the household, relevant values and freedoms, marital history, and details about their 
relations with their spouse and their kinsfolk.   
 
4. Results 
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In this section, we first present subject characteristics by site (Section 4.1), followed by 
information on assignment to treatment and balancing tests (Section 4.2), aggregate 
patterns of behaviour in the experimental games (Section 4.3), and an analysis of 
behaviour in the games through comparisons of mean female and male contributions by 
treatment and site, first without (Section 4.4) and then conditioning on socio-economic 
characteristics (Section 4.5). 
 
4.1 Subject characteristics  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conjugality indicators by site are presented in Table 1, which is based on the 965 married 
couples assigned to the treatments considered in this paper. A clear India/Africa contrast 
can be observed in the incidence of arranged marriage, as well as divorce. The incidence 
of arranged marriage ranges from 85 per cent to 94 per cent across the three Indian sites, 
and from 4 to 23 per cent across the five African sites. As to divorce, it is very rare for 
husbands in the Indian sites to have been married more than once: the mean number of 
times they have been married ranges from 1.00 to 1.05. By contrast, across the African 
sites, the number of times husbands have been married ranges from 1.08 to 1.61. These 
figures for divorce and arranged marriage are consistent with the reason we had selected 
sites both in India and in Africa. We had expected both marriage of spouses’ own volition 
and divorce to be more frequent in Africa than in India, which is confirmed here. 
 A second motive for site selection is variation in female economic independence. Our 
purpose was to encourage such variation both through the East Africa/West Africa and 
through the North India/South India contrast. In line with this, women are much more 
frequently primarily home makers (so as a rule not economically independent) in our East 
African than in our West African, and in our North Indian than in our South Indian sites. 
In the Ethiopian sites, 64 – 74 per cent of wives are primarily home makers, whereas 
across the Nigerian sites, this figure ranges from 7 to 23 per cent. In North India, 46 per 
cent of wives are home makers in rural Uttar Pradesh and 58 per cent in Varanasi; in rural 
Tamil Nadu the figure is as low as 16 per cent.  
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 On another indicator of (absence of) female economic independence, the inability to 
make independent consumption decisions, the East vs. West Africa contrast is again 
confirmed, but the North vs. South India contrast is not. The percentage of wives who 
need permission to buy a dress is, as expected, much higher in our East African (almost 
90 per cent) rural sites than in the West African ones (21 – 42 per cent). However, 68 per 
cent of wives in rural Tamil Nadu in South India need permission to buy a sari, whereas 
the corresponding figures for rural and urban (Varanasi) Uttar Pradesh are 47 and 42 per 
cent, respectively. For very similar deviations from the previously expected North/South 
India contrast in female autonomy in spending decisions, see Rahan and Rao (2004).  
For comparison with the related literature, we also report how often wives primarily 
decide on spending household income. Unlike in South East Asia, where female control 
over household finances is common and held responsible for husbands hiding resources 
from their wives (Ashraf, 2009), women deciding on how household income is spent is 
always rare in our sites: never more than 15 per cent and usually considerably lower.  
Overall, the contrasts in conjugality indicators observed here are broadly consistent 
with the expected differences in wives’ independence and control over resources – 
greater in West than in East Africa, in Africa than in India, and (with the exception of 
personal consumption) in South than in North India. This suggests a low degree of 
separation between spouses in economic activities in India – especially North India, a 
high degree of such separation in northern Nigeria, and an intermediate degree in 
Ethiopia, which is consistent with our motives for site selection presented in Section 3.1. 
Put cautiously, site selection clearly has produced substantial between-site variation in 
conjugality, which is broadly in line with the ethnographic record. 
 
4.2 Assignment to treatment and balancing tests 
As outlined in Section 3.2, the sample of 965 married couples of interest in this study is 
drawn from a larger sample of 3,068 couples, about equally distributed across the eight 
sites. The couples were randomly assigned to treatments, so that for any treatment 
conducted in a site, each couple has the same chance of taking part in that treatment. Our 
original plan was to assign 40 couples per site to each treatment. We deviated from that 
plan only in one instance, among the Maguzawa in northern Nigeria, where 45 couples 
  
16 
 
were assigned to the base version of the experimental game. This was done for pragmatic 
reasons.10 Table 2 shows the distribution of the 965 married couples across the treatments 
and sites. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In each session conducted in a site, all three treatments were played, so that random 
assignment to treatment took place at the level of the couple. Nonetheless, inadvertent 
selection due to chance remains a possibility, which may bias the measurement of 
treatment effects. We investigated this in two ways (see Table 3). First, for each site we 
compare observed subject characteristics between the couples in the treatments 
considered here and the full sample in that site. We look at female age, female education, 
male age, and male education, all in years, and compare variable means using a two-sided 
t-test between the full site-specific sample and the sub-sample comprising the three 
treatments considered here. None of the four variables times eight sites equals thirty-two 
comparisons reported in Table 3 is statistically significant, suggesting no inadvertent 
selection has taken place at this level. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, for each of the three treatments separately, for each site, we conducted a logistic 
regression of assignment to treatment on male and female age and education. Table 3 
reports for each of the 24 site/treatment-specific regressions the Χ2 test statistic of the 
null hypothesis that all four coefficients are jointly equal to zero, and corresopnding p-
values. Of the 24 test statistics only two are significant at the 10 per cent level, suggesting 
that inadvertent selection to treatment by site is at most a minor issue. To deal with it, we 
control for observed socio-economic characteristics when investigating treatment effects. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The Maguzawa sample was smaller than originally intended; we decided to scrap some treatments not 
considered in the paper, and allocated a residue of 5 couples to the base version. 
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4.3 Aggregate patterns of behaviour in the experimental games 
Table 4 contains summary statistics by site of variables capturing contribution and 
allocation behaviour in the experimental games, as well as expectations of spouses’ 
behaviour. Female contributions range from 44 per cent of endowments in Mehal Meda, 
a rural site in Ethiopia, to 64 per cent in Varanasi, our urban site in North India. On 
average, wives contribute 52 per cent of endowments. Male contributions range from 44 
per cent among the Maguzawa in northern Nigeria to 63 per cent in Varanasi. On average, 
husbands contribute 56 per cent of endowments: somewhat higher than wives’ 
contributions, which is also the case in six out of our eight sites (exceptions are the 
Maguzawa and Varanasi). 
 When female and male contributions are combined, in order to obtain a measure of 
efficiency of intra-household decision making, contributions range from 47 per cent 
among the Maguzawa to 64 per cent in Varanasi. Among the Maguzawa this implies 
inefficiency of about 18 per cent: 53 per cent of endowments are not contributed so 
household earnings are (.47 ∗ 1.5 + .53)/1.5 ≈ 82 per cent of what they could have been. 
In Varanasi, inefficiency is about 12 per cent. As may be seen in Table 4, efficiency is 
highest in urban North India, lowest in our two West African sites, and in between these 
extremes in our other sites. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Before spouses’ contributions were revealed to each other, we asked them how much 
they expected their spouse to contribute. Recall that we did not reveal to subjects the 
precise endowment their spouse had received, so we asked this question hypothetically: 
“Supposing your spouse has received X, how much do you think s/he will contribute to 
the common pot?” In practice, we mentioned here the actual amount received, which 
equates to the maximum amount in the range of amounts mentioned as possibilities; see 
Section 2.2 for our reasons. 
 Wives’ expectations of how much husbands would withhold from contributing to the 
common pot were 50 per cent of endowments on average. In reality, husbands withheld 
44 per cent on average (100 – 56 per cent contributed), so wives somewhat overestimated 
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how much husbands would withhold. Wives’ expectations of husbands withholding 
ranged from 39 per cent in Varanasi to 60 per cent in Hadiya in rural Ethiopia. 
 Husbands’ expectations of wives withholding endowments ranged from 42 per cent in 
rural Tamil Nadu, in South India, to 53 per cent among the Maguzawa in northern 
Nigeria. The average expectations of withholding 47 per cent were close to the actual of 
48 per cent. We will make use of expectations of spousal contributions in the regression 
analysis of contribution behaviour (Section 4.5). 
 When it comes to distributing the common pot (after interest was added), wives in 
treatment “female control” allocate 53 per cent to themselves on average. This ranges 
from 44 per cent among the Maguzawa to 59 per cent in rural Uttar Pradesh, in North 
India. Husbands in treatment “male control” allocate 40 per cent to themselves on 
average. This ranges from 24 per cent in rural Tamil Nadu, in South India, to 49 per cent 
in Mehal Meda, in rural Ethiopia. 
 Although the apparent relative generosity of husbands is quite striking, we do not 
focus on allocation behaviour in this paper. The reasons are, first, that these allocations 
can be undone after the experiment, which we do not observe. Second, we do not know 
what the money will be spent on: household goods, private goods, gifts to household 
members, gifts to others, and so forth. For that reason we cannot equate experimental 
receipts with ultimate benefits. Third, and related, spouses may influence each other’s 
spending. In an extreme case of power imbalance, the dominant spouse could simply 
instruct their partner what to spend the money received in the experiment on. 
 By contrast, money not contributed to the common pot could have earned interest that 
is voluntarily forfeited. This represents an efficiency loss that cannot be regained after the 
experiment. Contribution behaviour is therefore final in a sense that allocation behaviour 
is not. We will next analyse how contribution behaviour responds to the identity of the 
spouse in charge of allocation of the common pot. 
 
4.4 Contributions to the common pot by treatment 
Figure 1 displays male and female contribution rates (as a percentage of endowments) by 
treatment and site. Comparing contribution behaviour in the “female control” treatment 
with that in the base version of the experiment shows that in six out of eight sites, female 
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contributions are lower in the “female control” treatment than in the base, and in two sites 
higher. In that same treatment, so when wives control the allocation of the common pot, 
male contributions are lower than in the base in seven out of eight sites, and higher in one. 
 On the face of it, “male control” suppresses contributions somewhat less than “female 
control”. In four out of eight sites, “male control” lowers female contributions, and in the 
other four it raises them, compared to the base. When men control the allocation of the 
common pot, male contributions are lower than in the base in five out of eight sites, and 
higher in the remaining three. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is striking that when spouses are in charge of the allocation of the common pot, they do 
not contribute their entire endowment, with own contribution rates among those in charge 
of allocation even frequently being lower than in the base. This raises the question why, 
when individuals can secure a positive return on investment by allocating to themselves a 
commensurate share of the common pot, they do not do so. We address this question in 
Section 5 when comparing our findings with those of the related literature. 
 
 “Female control” treatment effects 
 We next turn to testing whether treatment effects are significant. In Table 5, female 
contributions, male contributions and household efficiency (male contributions plus 
female contributions) are compared between the “female control” and the base version of 
the game, by site. For assessing statistical significance, we use a two-sided two-sample t-
test, and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, a non-parametric alternative based on the order in 
which the observations from the two samples fall. 
 To begin with female contributions in the “female control” treatment, these are 
significantly lower than in the base, by between 15 and 20 percentage points, in three 
sites: Varanasi, Mehal Meda and Hadiya. Varanasi in North India was selected because it 
represents centralised male control over intra-household resource allocation, whereas the 
two rural Ethiopian sites represent, to differing degrees, intermediate regimes between 
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separate spheres and unified decision making: men and women pursue some joint 
agricultural activities but also some separate income-earning activities. 
 When it comes to husbands’ contributions, “female control” lowers these statistically 
significantly, compared to the base, in Varanasi (by 19 percentage points) and in Hadiya 
(by 12 percentage points); it raises them among the Maguzawa (by 8 percentage points). 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
When controlling for socio-economic characteristics (Tables 7, A1 and A2), the treatment 
effect of “female control” retains statistical significance for Varanasi (both for male and 
female contributions), for female contributions in Mehal Meda, and for male 
contributions in Hadiya; both the effect on female contributions for Hadiya, and the effect 
on male contributions among the Maguzawa lose significance, which we therefore do not 
think of as robust treatment effects. 
 We summarise the robust treatment effects in two results. 
 
Result 1. Female control over the intra-household allocation of resources lowers female 
contributions in two out of eight sites. They are Varanasi, a city in North India selected to 
represent centralised male control of household resources; and Mehal Meda, a site in 
rural Ethiopia in which husbands and wives farm together while also controlling their 
own independent income streams. 
 
Result 2. Female control lowers male contributions in two out of eight sites. They are 
Varanasi and Hadiya. Hadiya like Mehal Meda is characterised by a mixture of joint 
agriculture and spouses’ separate pursuit of income-earning activities; the difference 
with Mehal Meda is that women’s involvement in agriculture is traditionally greater. 
 
As a result of the suppressing effect on male or female contributions, the combined effect 
is statistically significant in each of the three sites featured so far: male plus female 
contributions as a percentage of endowments go down by 19 percentage points in 
Varanasi, 10 percentage points in Mehal Meda, and 15 percentage points in Hadiya. The 
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combined effect, although small (6 percentage points) is significant in rural Tamil Nadu, 
in South India, too. We sum this up in our third result. 
 
Result 3. Female control lowers efficiency of intra-household resource allocation in four 
out of eight sites, two of them in India, and two in rural Ethiopia. 
 
In marked contrast to the suppressing effects on contributions commented on so far, the 
“female control” treatment significantly raises female contributions, by 10 percentage 
points, in Hausaland. This treatment effect is robust to controlling for socio-economic 
characteristics (Tables 7, A1 and A2) and is thus an instance of heterogeneous treatment 
effects. Interestingly, the one site where female control significantly raises female 
contributions is also the one site where the ethnographic record is one of wives being 
firmly in charge of substantial independent income streams (Hill, 1969, 1972; Jackson, 
1978; Schildkrout, 1982; Pittin, 2002). The fact that more control does not apparently 
give women (with the exception of the Hausa) the confidence to contribute more to the 
household, is worth noting. We summarise this finding for the Hausa in the next result. 
 
Result 4. Female control raises female contributions in one out of eight sites. This is 
among the Hausa in rural northern Nigeria, the site where female control over resources 
is most firmly established. 
 
As implied above, this result does not carry through to male plus female contributions, so 
to household efficiency being significantly higher.  
 
“Male control” treatment effects 
In marked contrast to “female control”, “male control” has little effect on either male or 
female contributions (Table 6). The apparent effect in Mehal Meda on female 
contributions is significant at the 10 per cent level only in the case of the t-test; and loses 
statistical significance when socio-economic characteristics are controlled for (Table 7). 
Likewise, the apparent effect in Varanasi on male contributions is significant at the 10 
per cent level in the case of both tests reported in Table 6, and is no longer significant in 
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Table 7. The combined effect (male plus female contributions) is never consistently 
significant at the 5 per cent level either (Table 6). We summarise as follows. 
 
Result 5. Male control over the intra-household allocation of resources has no robust 
effects in any of our eight sites on female contributions to a household public good, nor 
on male contributions nor on the efficiency of intra-household resource allocation. 
 
Before discussing the effects of socio-economic characteristics on spousal contributions, 
one implication of the findings discussed so far is worth spelling out. For neither of the 
two treatments in any of our eight sites does efficiency ever increase compared to the 
base version of the game. A simple 50/50 allocation rule is never outperformed by 
leaving the allocation of the common pot to either spouse: male plus female contributions 
are in four cases significantly lower (all four in the “female control” treatment) but never 
significantly higher than in the base version of the game. This gives rise to our next result. 
 
Result 6. Neither “male control” nor “female control”, compared to the base version of 
the game, raises efficiency of intra-household resource allocation in any of our eight sites. 
 
4.5 Regression analysis 
In Table 7, the results of estimating Eq. (1) are reported, using tobit regressions. The 
results of using OLS and ordered probit are in Tables A1 and A2. These results lead to 
the same conclusions as the tobit models about which treatment effects are robust, 
commented on above. They also lead to the same conclusions about statistical 
significance of site dummies, expectations of the other spouse’s contributions and socio-
economic correlates of contribution behaviour, commented on next. 
 We first comment on site dummies. All site dummies are positive, suggesting higher 
contributions than in the reference site, among the Hausa. For male contributions, only 
Varanasi is statistically significant. For female contributions, Varanasi, rural Tamil Nadu 
and all three Ethiopian site dummies are statistically significant. The contrast is quite 
striking. Conditional on subject characteristics, female contributions are statistically 
  
23 
 
significantly higher in five sites in India and Ethiopia than among the Hausa in northern 
Nigeria; male contributions only in one site (Varanasi). 
 The performance of the treatment times site dummies has been commented on above, 
and has informed the results presented there. 
 When it comes to the role of expectations, these have a sizeable and statistically 
significant effect on contributions. The coefficient of .3350 on wives’ expectations of 
husbands contributing implies that for every ten percentage points increase in 
expectations of contributions, own contributions increase by 3.35 percentage points. On 
average wives expect husbands to contribute 50 per cent of endowments, whereas they 
themselves contribute 52 per cent. An increase in expectations of husbands contributing 
from 50 to 60 per cent would correspond with an increase in wives’ contributions from 
52 to over 55 per cent. The coefficient of .4045 on husbands’ expectations of wives’ 
contributions implies an even larger effect. We summarise this in our next result. 
 
Result 7. Expectations of spousal contributions to the common pot are a strong 
determinant of own contributions, both for wives and for husbands. 
 
Most socio-economic characteristics are not statistically significant. There are three 
exceptions: more highly educated males contribute more, wives of older men contribute 
less, and when wives decide on spending, their husbands contribute more. Although the 
last mentioned is significant only at the 10 per cent level, it retains significance across 
estimation methods (Tables A1 and A2). Whereas in another cultural context, wives’ 
control over household finances has been found to be a potential source of husbands 
withholding private money, and thereby potentially a source of inefficiency (Ashraf, 
2009), we do find evidence to the contrary. 
 
Result 8. Wives controlling spending of household income is associated with husbands’ 
contributions to the household public good being higher in the experimental game. 
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5. Discussion 
The question we asked in this paper is: Do the effects on the efficiency of intra-household 
resource allocation of exogenously altering the control of resources vary across local 
conjugal cultures? Using a PGG we obtain a measure of how “good” husbands and wives 
are at realising the potential joint surplus that their marriage embodies. For unrelated 
strangers, the individual income-maximising strategy in a PGG is to contribute nothing to 
the common pot.11 By contrast, husbands and wives are in an on-going relationship. If 
they are confident that the appropriate redistributing mechanisms are in place in the 
“meta-game” of their on-going relationship, then there is no tension between the 
individually and jointly optimal strategy: they should both contribute everything. This 
remains the case in each of the treatments considered in this paper. Since forfeited 
opportunities to fully realise the joint surplus cannot be undone after the experiment (the 
50 per cent the experimenters might have added to un-contributed endowment is 
permanently lost), their magnitude is a measure of Kaldor-Hicks allocative inefficiency 
and indicates inefficiencies in the on-going relationship of the married couple. 
Sites were selected to encourage variation in conjugality, along a spectrum running 
from marriages resembling the unitary household model, in North India, to those 
resembling separate spheres, in West Africa. Within sites, couples are randomly assigned 
to treatments, so if a treatment has an effect on contributions to the common pot, then we 
may infer that aspects of their on-going relationship with their spouse cause subjects to 
revise their expectations of a private return under the influence of this particular game 
manipulation. If treatment effects are heterogeneous across sites, then this indicates a role 
of the local conjugal culture. 
 We next summarise our findings, compare them with the related literature, and spell 
out implications for theory and policy. 
 
 
 
5.1 Summary of findings 
                                                 
11 Peters et al. (2004) compare contributions to a public good, using a voluntary contribution mechanism, 
between groups containing family members only and groups containing unrelated strangers also; they do 
indeed find higher contributions in the former groups. 
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Our findings may be summarised as follows. First, using survey data, we found evidence 
broadly corroborating our motives for site selection. As expected, marriage of spouses’ 
own volition and divorce are more frequent in our African than in our Indian sites. Also 
as expected, wives are more likely to be home makers in our East African than in our 
West African sites, and in our North Indian than in our South Indian sites. In line with 
expectations, wives in East Africa have lower autonomy in the domain of personal 
consumption decisions than those in West Africa; but the usually expected lower 
autonomy in North than in South India in personal consumption is not confirmed, in line 
with the very similar findings of Rahan and Rao (2004). Broadly speaking, site selection 
has encouraged variation in conjugality consistent with the ethnographic record 
summarised in Section 3.1: from a situation approaching unified household decision-
making in North India to one approaching spouses maintaining completely separate 
economies among the Hausa in northern Nigeria, with the Ethiopian sites representing 
intermediate regimes (some distinctly joint, some distinctly separate resource allocation 
decisions), and the South Indian site and the Maguzawa in northern Nigeria representing 
toned-down versions of, respectively, the more starkly unified decision-making processes 
in North India and the separate spheres of control over resources found among the Hausa. 
Also important for positioning our findings in relation to previous literature (see below) 
is that female control over household finances is rare in all our sites, unlike the prevailing 
practice in many south-eastern Asian countries (Ashraf, 2009). 
 Second, we find that female plus male contributions to the common pot in the 
experiments range from 47 per cent of endowments to 64 per cent, implying inefficiency 
of 12 – 18 per cent. Contributions are highest in urban North India, lowest in our two 
West African sites, and in between those two extremes in our other sites. Broadly 
speaking, the more separate decision-making is in real life, the lower spousal 
contributions are to the common pot in the experiments. 
 Third, “female control” has a large number of robust treatment effects. It lowers 
female contributions in two sites (Varanasi and Mehal Meda), it raises female 
contributions in one site (among the Hausa), it lowers male contributions in two sites 
(Varanasi and Hadiya), and it lowers efficiency (male plus female contributions) in four 
sites (Varanasi, Mehal Meda, Hausa and Tamil Nadu). By contrast, “male control” has no 
  
26 
 
robust treatment effects: not on female contributions, not on male contributions, and not 
on efficiency. 
 Fourth, in regression analysis we find that the signs of the coefficients on site 
dummies are in line with motives for site selection; expectations of spousal contributions 
are an important determinant of own contributions; and when wives control household 
finances in real life, husband contributions to the common pot in the experiments go up. 
The last-mentioned finding provides an interesting contrast with Ashraf (2009)’s findings 
for the Philippines; we comment on it below. 
 
5.2 Comparison with the directly related literature 
In previous lab-in-the-field studies using married couples in which the exertion of 
individual spousal control is examined as a potential determinant of the inefficiency of 
the intra-household allocation of resources, giving wives control over resources has 
sometimes been found to be a source of inefficiency (Kebede et al., 2014; Munro et al., 
2014) and sometimes to make households more efficient (Iversen et al., 2011). For 
“female control” we find a large number of robust effects: negative effects in two sites on 
male contributions, negative effects in two sites on female contributions, and negative 
effects in four sites on efficiency. However, for the Hausa, we find a robust positive 
effect of “female control”, on female contributions, which suggests a role for the local 
context, as we will argue below. For giving husbands control over resources (called the 
“male control” treatment in our study), the studies cited do not find any robust treatment 
effects; nor do we, in any site.  
The effect of female control over resources on efficiency appears to be culture-specific. 
In the Philippines, where female control over household finances is common, the absence 
of such control appears to increase efficiency (Ashraf, 2009).12 The interpretation of this 
finding is that husbands have incentives to hide some of their income from their wives if 
their wives are in control of household finances (ibid.: 1267). 
In a similar vein, in PGG experiments in eastern Uganda, giving women control over 
the allocation increased both male and female contributions to the common pot (Iversen 
                                                 
12 Ashraf (2009), in an auxiliary treatment, finds that 21 per cent of subjects sacrifice cash in order to 
ensure that their endowment goes to an account of their choosing. The mechanism for this efficiency loss is 
not causally established, but interpreted to be a desire for control. 
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et al., 2011). Jackson (2013: 34) in her reflections on these findings suggests that in this 
research site, women being in charge of the common pot implies that the money in it is 
regarded as reserved for household consumption – corresponding with a well-established 
female role obligation.   
By contrast, in our sites, in which such female control over resources is rare, its 
experimentally induced presence, when it does have an effect, tends to decrease both 
male and female contributions and thereby lower household efficiency. Overall, the 
strong effects for “female control”, when compared with the absence of effects for “male 
control”, suggest that transferring control to the spouse who is not the one normally in 
charge may be unsettling when corresponding obligations and expectations of obligations 
are not (yet) established. The suppressing effect of “female control” on female 
contributions is remarkable too: for women, holding on to the private endowment may be 
safer than being seen to allocate it to oneself unless allocating to oneself is a well-
established practice in spouses’ relations outside the experiment, as it clearly is among 
the Hausa (see references in Section 3.1). 
Finally, a remarkable feature of our findings, similarly found by Iversen et al. (2011), 
Kebede et al. (2014), and Munro et al. (2014), is that spouses do not contribute their 
entire endowment to the common pot even when they themselves are in charge of 
allocating it, and thus would seem to be in a position to guarantee a positive return on 
their investment. This suggests that endowment (secretly) retained is regarded differently 
from money allocated to oneself from the common pot: perhaps the latter is thought of as 
more fungible than the former, in the sense that it may be more susceptible to spending 
adjustments by one’s spouse in response to one’s windfall income. 
 
5.3 Main lessons for theory and policy 
The most important insight for policy that we take from these contrasting treatment 
effects is that attempts to influence wives’ control over intra-household resource 
allocation may be unsettling and may therefore – in the cases of friction with existing 
norms – cause spouses to reduce their contributions to the household (become more 
private and less joint) at least until new norms are properly established. For that reason, 
evidence from naturally occurring data that spouses’ independent pursuit of separate 
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activities tends to be inefficient because the weaker spouse misses out on access to 
productive inputs (Udry, 1996; World Bank, 2011) should not be interpreted as meaning 
that successfully promoting the latter’s access to such inputs will, on its own, make the 
household more efficient.  
In theoretical terms, such interventions may increase the likelihood of a separate 
spheres equilibrium, with concomitant inefficiency, as opposed to the efficient income 
pooling one (cf. Lechene and Preston, 2011). Modelling spouses’ optimal response to a 
shift in the balance of power that results from such an intervention, or more generally 
from a change in extra-environmental parameters, should realistically allow for spouses 
who have lost power seeking to regain it, as well as spouses who have gained it seeking 
to hold onto it, through modifying their contributions to the household (cf. Basu, 2006). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Previous lab-in-the-field experiments that study the determinants of household efficiency, 
although implemented in a variety of conjugal cultures, do not systematically relate 
treatment effects to cultural variation. The sources of inefficiency that they point to may 
be limited to their particular cultural setting. Moreover, a fruitful comparison of their 
findings is hindered by differences in design and details of implementation, as well as by 
the fact that variation in conjugality is accidental, not built into the design. 
 We therefore purposively varied conjugality and implemented in identical fashion a 
consistent experimental design. This increases our confidence that any heterogeneity in 
treatment effects is due to differences in the local conjugal culture. We selected two sites 
in North India to represent unified households, and a site in South India with a somewhat 
greater degree of separation in economic activities between spouses than in North India. 
Three sites were selected in Ethiopia to represent a mixture of joint and separate activities 
akin to those in cooperative bargaining models, with a hoe economy site presenting less 
separation than the site with a plough economy. Finally, we selected two sites in northern 
Nigeria to represent separate spheres, again with less separation in one of the two sites 
because of some joint agriculture. Site selection thus ensured variation in conjugality. 
We find that inefficiency is widespread and tends to be higher when separation 
between spouses is higher. Furthermore, we find that giving husbands control over the 
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allocation of resources has no robust treatment effects, whereas giving wives such control 
has a large number of robust treatment effects. In particular, both male and female 
contributions, and therefore household efficiency, tend to be lower when wives are given 
control over the allocation. However, among the Hausa in northern Nigeria, whose 
women in daily life are active, financially independent traders from their homesteads, 
female contributions go up when wives control the allocation in the experiment.  
Policies that attempt to increase women’s control over the intra-household allocation 
of resources should therefore not expect improvements in household efficiency as a 
matter of course. When such control is not yet well established, husbands and wives may 
reduce their contributions to the household.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of conjugality indicators by site 
 India   Ethiopia   Nigeria  
 North  South Capital North South Northern 
(Muslim) 
Northern (non-
Muslim) 
 Urban Rural Rural Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural 
 Varanasi 
(VAR) 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Tamil Nadu 
(TAM) 
Addis Ababa 
(ADI) 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Hadiya 
(HAD) 
Hausa 
(HAU) 
Maguzawa 
(MAG) 
Arranged marriage (=1) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
.85 
.36 
 
.94 
.24 
 
.86 
.35 
 
.04 
.20 
 
.23 
.42 
 
.15 
.36 
 
.20 
.40 
 
.06 
.25 
Times married (husband, #) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
1.05 
.27 
 
1.03 
.16 
 
1 
0 
 
1.28 
.64 
 
1.61 
.94 
 
1.08 
.31 
 
1.43 
.94 
 
1.10 
.48 
Wife is primarily home maker 
(=1) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
 
.58 
.50 
 
 
.46 
.50 
 
 
.16 
.37 
 
 
.66 
.48 
 
 
.64 
.48 
 
 
.74 
.44 
 
 
.23 
.42 
 
 
.07 
.26 
Wife needs permission to buy 
dress/sari (=1) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
 
.42 
.50 
 
 
.47 
.50 
 
 
.68 
.47 
 
 
.59 
.49 
 
 
.88 
.33 
 
 
.89 
.31 
 
 
.42 
.50 
 
 
.21 
.41 
Wife primarily decides on 
spending household income 
(=1) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
 
 
 
.11 
.31 
 
 
 
.07 
.25 
 
 
 
 
.15 
.36 
 
 
 
.03 
.18 
 
 
 
.02 
.13 
 
 
 
.02 
.13 
 
 
 
.01 
.09 
 
 
 
0 
0 
N (number of married couples) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 125 
Notes: The table is based on household survey data for the 965 married couples that were randomly assigned to treatments considered in this paper (see Table 2). 
  
  
33 
 
Table 2 
Assignment to treatment, by site 
 India   Ethiopia   Nigeria   
 North  South Capital North South Northern 
(Muslim) 
Northern (non-
Muslim) 
 
 Urban Rural Rural Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural  
 Varanasi 
(VAR) 
Uttar Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Tamil Nadu 
(TAM) 
Addis Ababa 
(ADI) 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Hadiya 
(HAD) 
Hausa (HAU) Maguzawa 
(MAG) 
All 
N (number of 
married couples) 
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 125 965 
By game version:          
  Base 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 45 325 
  “female control” 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 320 
  “male control” 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 320 
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Table 3 
Balancing tests by site 
 India   Ethiopia   Nigeria  
 North  South Capital North South Northern 
(Muslim) 
Northern (non-
Muslim) 
 Urban Rural Rural Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural 
 Varanasi 
(VAR) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(TAM) 
Addis 
Ababa 
(ADI) 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Hadiya 
(HAD) 
Hausa 
(HAU) 
Maguzawa 
(MAG) 
Female age, mean # years 39.0 
(.60) 
43.2 
(.30) 
40.6 
(.56) 
36.6 
(.39) 
33.7 
(.83) 
36.4 
(.36) 
25.0 
(.92) 
29.4 
(.44) 
Male age, mean # years 43.5 
(.66) 
47.4 
(.39) 
47.8 
(.72) 
42.2 
(.13) 
42.4 
(.84) 
44.8 
(.32) 
37.1 
(.86) 
38.9 
(.58) 
Female education,  mean # 
years 
4.2 
(.96) 
3.2 
(.69) 
4.5 
(.67) 
7.4 
(.38) 
2.8 
(.89) 
3.8 
(.71) 
3.5 
(.91) 
3.7 
(.75) 
Male education,  mean # years 6.8 
(.82) 
7.6 
(.34) 
5.2 
(.72) 
9.4 
(.44) 
4.11 
(.79) 
5.6 
(.30) 
5.1 
(.77) 
5.4 
(.96) 
Tests for inadvertent selection 
in random assignment to 
treatment: 
        
  Base 
  𝜒2test statistic 
  p-value 
 
2.73 
.60 
 
6.88 
.14 
 
6.30 
.10 
 
1.91 
.75 
 
1.85 
.76 
 
13.06 
.01 
 
8.10 
.09 
 
5.67 
.22 
  “female control” 
  𝜒2test statistic 
  p-value 
 
4.68 
.32 
 
5.97 
.20 
 
4.29 
.37 
 
1.27 
.87 
 
7.23 
.12 
 
7.77 
.10 
 
3.22 
.52 
 
.15 
.99 
  “male control” 
  𝜒2test statistic 
  p-value 
 
4.48 
.35 
 
3.35 
.50 
 
6.96 
.14 
 
1.80 
.77 
 
5.92 
.21 
 
5.08 
.28 
 
1.75 
.78 
 
5.17 
.27 
Notes: Variable means by site are for the married couples that were randomly assigned to the game versions considered in the paper (see Table 2). Figures in 
parentheses are p-values for a two-sided t-test of variable means for subjects in these game versions being equal to variable means in the full site-specific sample.  
𝜒2test statistics and p-values are reported for logistic regressions by site of assignment to treatment on male and female age and education.    
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Table 4 
Mean values of variables capturing game behaviour and expectations, by site (Std. Dev. in parentheses) 
 India   Ethiopia   Nigeria   
 North  South Capital North South Northern 
(Muslim) 
Northern (non-
Muslim) 
 
 Urban Rural Rural Urban Rural Rural Rural Rural  
 Varanasi 
(VAR) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(UPR) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(TAM) 
Addis 
Ababa 
(ADI) 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Hadiya 
(HAD) 
Hausa 
(HAU) 
Maguzawa 
(MAG) 
All 
Female contributions (fraction of 
endowments) 
.64 
(.31) 
.52 
(.24) 
.47 
(.20) 
.58 
(.25) 
.44 
(.26) 
.56 
(.28) 
.47 
(.21) 
.50 
(.25) 
.52 
(.26) 
Male contributions (fraction of 
endowments) 
.63 
(.27) 
.63 
(.28) 
.55 
(.20) 
.59 
(.27) 
.56 
(.27) 
.61 
(.21) 
.48 
(.27) 
.44 
(.21) 
.56 
(.26) 
Female + male contributions 
(fraction of endowments) 
.64 
(.22) 
.57 
(.19) 
.51 
(.14) 
.59 
(.21) 
.50 
(.20) 
.58 
(.21) 
.48 
(.18) 
.47 
(.15) 
.54 
(.20) 
Wife expectations of husband 
withholding (fraction of 
endowments) 
.39 
(.28) 
.50 
(.25) 
.51 
(.22) 
.48 
(.21) 
.56 
(.22) 
.60 
(.23) 
.51 
(.18) 
.50 
(.18) 
.50 
(.23) 
Husband expectations of wife 
withholding (fraction of 
endowments) 
.48 
(.27) 
.46 
(.26) 
.42 
(.19) 
.45 
(.25) 
.49 
(.25) 
.47 
(.18) 
.49 
(.18) 
.53 
(.17) 
.47 
(.23) 
Wife allocation to self (fraction 
of common pot) 
.53 
(.24) 
.59 
(.14) 
.59 
(.20) 
.58 
(.09) 
.53 
(.06) 
.50 
(.02) 
.46 
(.08) 
.44 
(.07) 
.53 
(.14) 
Husband allocation to self 
(fraction of common pot) 
.25 
(.28) 
.34 
(.21) 
.24 
(.13) 
.30 
(.20) 
.49 
(.12) 
.48 
(.08) 
.57 
(.08) 
.55 
(.08) 
.40 
(.21) 
          
N (number of married couples) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 125 965 
Notes. Expectations of spouse withholding endowment were elicited for the maximum possible endowment. Allocation to self in the “female control” and “male 
control” treatment, respectively, was elicited using a strategy method: for each possible contribution a spouse could have made, the person in charge of allocation 
was asked how they wanted to divide the common pot. The figures reported are average allocations across each possible contribution a spouse could have made.  
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Table 5 
“Female control” treatment and contributions to the common pot (percentage of endowments) 
Site Description Base Treatment t-
statistic 
P-
value 
z-
statistic 
P-
value 
India Wife mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 53.1 3.142 .002 3.031 .002 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) Rural, North 49.4 53.8 -.864 .391 -.793 .428 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 50.0 45.6 .961 .340 1.038 .299 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 58.8 56.9 .399 .691 .058 .953 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 53.8 34.4 3.500 .001 3.510 .000 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 64.4 49.4 2.671  .009 2.666 .008 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 43.1 53.1 -2.001  .049 -1.779 .075 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
50.0 48.1 .368  .714 -.394 .693 
India Husband mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 54.4 3.260 .002 3.090 .002 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) Rural, North 68.1 60.6 1.186 .239 1.387 .165 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 58.1 51.3 1.497 .139 1.208 .227 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 59.4 55.6 .653 .516 .867 .386 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 58.8 57.5 .216  .830 .392 .695 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 66.3 53.8 2.970 .004 2.420 .016 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 48.8 40.0 1.591  .116 1.297 .195 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
41.1 49.4 -2.069  .042 -1.805 .071 
India Wife + husband mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 53.8 4.313 .000 3.872 .000 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) Rural, North 58.8 57.2 .393 .696 .453 .651 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 54.1 48.4 1.842 .069 1.803 .071 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 59.1 56.3 .666 .507 .450 .653 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 56.3 45.9 2.727 .008 2.719 .007 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 65.3 51.6 3.319 .001 3.063 .002 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 45.9 46.6 -.150 .881 -.049 .961 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
45.6 48.8 -1.072 .287 -1.445 .148 
Notes: P-values and test statistics for a two-sided two-sample t-test and two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test of the null hypothesis that for a particular site mean contributions to the common pot 
are equal in the base version and the “female control” treatment of the PGG. 
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Table 6 
“Male control” treatment and contributions to the common pot (percentage of endowments) 
Site Description Base Treatment t-
statistic 
P-
value 
z-
statistic 
P-
value 
India Wife mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 65.6 1.119  .267 .921 .357 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) Rural, North 49.4 51.9 -.442 .660 -.166 .868 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 50.0 44.4 1.297  .199 1.163 .245 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 58.8 59.4 -.100 .921 .005 .996 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 53.8 43.1 1.842 .069 2.112 .035 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 64.4 53.8 1.639 .105 1.518 .129 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 43.1 44.4 -.309 .758 -.269 .788 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
50.0 51.3 -.211 .834 -.623 .534 
India Husband mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 62.5 1.782 .079 1.696 .090 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) Rural, North 68.1 60.6 1.152 .253 1.330 .184 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 58.1 55.6 .597 .552 .459 .646 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 59.4 63.1 -.634 .528 -.359 .720 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 58.8 53.1 .891 .376 .958 .338 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 66.3 63.1 .603 .548 .502 .615 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 48.8 56.3 -1.239 .219 -1.468 .142 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
41.1 42.5 -.295 .769 .665 .506 
India Wife + husband mean contributions 
Varanasi (VAR) Urban, North 73.1 64.1 1.933 .057 1.763 .078 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) Rural, North 58.8 56.3 .545 .588 .759 .448 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) Rural, South 54.1 50.0 1.362 .177 1.321 .187 
 
Ethiopia 
       
Addis Ababa (ADI) Capital city 59.1 61.3 -.431 .668 -.005 .996 
Mehal Meda 
(MHM) 
Rural, northern 56.3 48.1 1.751 .084 2.276 .023 
Hadiya (HAD) Rural, southern 65.3 58.4 1.386 .170 1.560 .118 
 
Nigeria 
       
Hausa (HAU) Rural, northern 45.9 50.3 -1.145 .256 -1.241 .215 
Maguzawa (MAG) Pre-Muslim 
Hausa 
45.6 46.9 -.362 .718 -.555 .579 
Notes: P-values and test statistics for a two-sided two-sample t-test and two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test of the null hypothesis that for a particular site mean contributions to the common pot 
are equal in the base version and the “female control” treatment of the PGG. 
 
Table 7 
Regression analysis of spouses’ contribution behaviour (tobit model) 
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 Contribution of wife 
(fraction of endowment) 
Contribution of husband 
(fraction of endowment) 
Varanasi (VAR) .2920*** 
(.0855) 
.2283*** 
(.0842) 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) .0390 
(.0654) 
.1414 
(.1194) 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) .1025* 
(.0546) 
.0187 
(.0821) 
Addis Ababa (ADI) .1502** 
(.0624) 
.0295 
(.0843) 
Mehal Meda (MHM) .1743** 
(.0808) 
.1093 
(.1031) 
Hadiya (HAD) .2603** 
(.1224) 
.1485 
(.0932) 
Hausa (HAU) (omitted)   
Maguzawa (MAG) .1729 
(.1417) 
-.1023 
(.0710) 
VAR x “female control” (FC) -.2203*** 
(.0798) 
-.2312*** 
(.0458) 
UPR x FC .0950 
(.0726) 
-.0370 
(.0965) 
TAM x FC -.0765 
(.0572) 
-.0853 
(.0746) 
ADI x FC -.0345 
(.0593) 
-.0323 
(.0609) 
MHM x FC -.2420*** 
(.0867) 
-.0190 
(.0828) 
HAD x FC -.1296 
(.1268) 
-.1267** 
(.0524) 
HAU x FC .0971** 
(.0439) 
-.1341* 
(.0656) 
MAG x FC -.1084 
(.1340) 
.0560 
(.0557) 
VAR x “male control” (MC) -.0457 
(.1505) 
-.0974 
(.1060) 
UPR x MC -.0808 
(.0666) 
.0038 
(.1344) 
TAM x MC -.0900*** 
(.0204) 
-.0089 
(.0336) 
ADI x MC -.0556 
(.0656) 
.0578 
(.0675) 
MHM x MC -.1372 
(.1069) 
-.1053 
(.1046) 
HAD x MC -.0953 
(.2067) 
-.0391 
(.0777) 
HAU x MC .0756 
(.0629) 
-.0231 
(.0963) 
MAG x MC -.1173 
(.1247) 
.0513 
(.0564) 
Female age in years .0023 
(.0018) 
-.0021 
(.0016) 
Male age in years -.0026* 
(.0014) 
.0016 
(.0013) 
Female education in years -.0007 
(.0034) 
.0053 
(.0035) 
Male education in years .0032 .0070** 
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 Contribution of wife 
(fraction of endowment) 
Contribution of husband 
(fraction of endowment) 
(.0027) (.0032) 
Arranged marriage (=1) -.0194 
(.0294) 
-.0020 
(.0336) 
Times married (husband, #) -.0025 
(.0160) 
-.0007 
(.0184) 
Wife is primarily home maker (=1) .0055 
(.0256) 
-.0057 
(.0203) 
Wife needs permission to buy dress/sari (=1) .0008 
(.0209) 
.0166 
(.0233) 
Wife primarily decides on spending 
household income (=1) 
.0306 
(.0395) 
.0580* 
(.0348) 
Wife expectations of husband withholding 
(fraction of endowments) 
-.3350*** 
(.0558) 
-.0173 
(.0479) 
Husband expectations of wife withholding 
(fraction of endowments) 
-.1072* 
(.0633) 
-.4045*** 
(.0720) 
   
Constant .6648*** 
(.0834) 
.6709*** 
(.0857) 
Pseudo R-squared .2458 .2881 
N 847 847 
Notes: Censored regression analysis (tobit model). Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and 
clustered at the session level. *** indicates significant at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% level. The 
lower N than all participating couples reflect missing values for some of the control variables. 
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Fig. 1. Control and mean contributions to the common pot by site (w-wife; h-husband) 
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Spousal Control and Efficiency of Intra-Household Decision Making: 
Experiments among Married Couples in India, Ethiopia and Nigeria 
 
ONLINE APPENDIX 
  
This online appendix contains a sample experimental script and Tables A1 and A2.  
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Experimental Instructions13 
 
[STEP 1: General introduction] 
 
Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. [Introduce EXPERIMENTERS 
and the assistants.] You can ask any of us questions during today’s programme. We have 
invited you here because we want to learn about how married couples in this area take 
decisions. All of you are going to be asked to do a task for money. We will then ask each 
of you what you want to do with the money you earn. Whatever money you gain today 
will be yours to keep. You will be asked very simple questions. Questions that do not 
have a correct answer, they are just about the way you think. For example, what is your 
favourite colour [ask someone in the room]? We cannot say that this answer is right or 
wrong. It is just your opinion and it can be different from the opinion of others in this 
room. However it is important to think seriously about your answers because they will 
affect how much money you will take home. 
 
What you need to do will be explained fully in a few minutes. But first we want to make 
a few things clear. First of all, this is not our money. We belong to a research 
organization, and this money has been given to us for research. Secondly, this is a study 
about how you make decisions. Therefore you should not talk with others. This is very 
important. Please be sure to obey this rule because it is possible for one person to spoil 
the activity for everyone. I’m afraid that if we find you talking with others, we will have 
to send you home, and you will not be able to earn any money here today. Of course, if 
you have questions, you can ask one of us. Thirdly, the study has two parts: today’s 
exercise is one, but we will also visit you in your homes in the coming weeks to ask both 
the husband and the wife a number of questions. Finally, make sure that you listen 
carefully to us. You will be able to make a good amount of money here today, and it is 
important that the instructions are clear for you so that you can follow them. 
  
                                                 
13 These are for the treatment female control in Ethiopia. The instructions for other treatments and other 
countries are identical apart from fairly obvious modifications. 
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 [Instructions for wives]14 
 
[STEP 2: Wives in a separate room – “Treatment Instructions” - To be read to ALL wives 
at the same time] 
 
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact amount will vary 
between people, but you will receive something between Birr 0 and Birr 40. [Show the 
envelope.] Your husband will receive a similar envelope and he will also receive an 
amount of money between Birr 0 and Birr 40. He doesn’t know how much you have in 
your envelope and you won’t be told how much he has in his envelope.  
 
You have to decide how much money to take out of the envelope and how much to leave 
in. Any money you take out of the envelope is yours to keep. Your husband will be 
making the same decision with his envelope. You can only take nothing, Birr 10, Birr 20, 
Birr 30 or Birr 40 out of the envelope. Other amounts are not allowed. So please 
remember: you can only take nothing, Birr 10, Birr 20, Birr 30 or Birr 40 out. 
 
After you have made your decision and your husband has made his decision we will 
bring you together again. We will put all the money that you and your husband have left 
in your envelopes into one envelope. We call it, the common envelope. To whatever is in 
the common envelope we will add another half again. So, if there are Birr 20 in the 
common envelope we will add another Birr 10 to make the total Birr 30. If there are Birr 
80 in the common envelope we will add another Birr 40 to make a total of Birr 120 and 
so on.  
 
Both of you will know the total amount of money in the common envelope.  
 
After that you will decide how to split the money in the common envelope. You have to 
decide how much to give to your husband and how much to keep for yourself. 
 
                                                 
14 Instructions for husbands appear later in the document.  
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In a moment we will give you some time to think about how much money you want to 
leave in your envelope. After you have made your decision, we will ask you some 
questions about how you want to divide the money in the common envelope between 
yourself and your husband. 
 
[STEP 3: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY – “Control Questions”] 
 
Let me ask some questions to check whether you understood the instructions. 
1. If you have Birr 40 in your envelope and you take out Birr 20 how much will be 
left in the envelope? [record the answer, correct participant if necessary] 
2. If you put Birr 20 into the common envelope and your husband puts in Birr 20 
how much will there be in total (before we add anything)? 
3. How much we will add if there is Birr 40 in the common envelope?  
4. How much will you receive if there is Birr 60 in the common envelope?   
 
[Record each answer, correct participant if necessary]15 
 
[STEP 4: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY – “Making the decision 1” - Once 
the experimenter is sure that the participant has understood the activity, give HER THE 
ENVELOPE AND some time to make her decision IN PRIVATE. Don’t forget to write 
down the decision in the data entry sheet.] 
 
[STEP 5: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY – Once the participant has taken 
the decision, continue reading the instructions] 
                                                 
15 [Responses to common questions: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE USED ONLY IN 
CASE PEOPLE ASK.]  
1. If you are asked whether the husband and wife will have the same amounts in their envelopes, 
answer: possibly, possibly not. 
2. If you are asked what ‘what should I do’, you should say that it is ‘your decision and I am not 
allowed to offer advice’ 
3. If you are asked precise arithmetical questions then answer them precisely. E.g if I put in Birr 40 
and my husband puts in nothing how much will you add to the total?’ Answer: Birr 20. 
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[Continuation of instructions for wives] 
 
You have left Birr [Y] in the envelope. In a few minutes we will put the money into one 
envelope, the common envelope.  
 
[For the questions which follow, read off the amounts from these tables.  
 
Amount added to common pool 
Y↓ Husband→ 0 10 20 30 40 
0 0 5 10 15 20 
10 5 10 15 20 25 
20 10 15 20 25 30 
30 15 20 25 30 35 
40 20 25 30 35 40 
 
 
Total amount in the common pool 
Y↓ Husband→ 0 10 20 30 40 
0 0 15 30 45 60 
10 15 30 45 60 75 
20 30 45 60 75 90 
30 45 60 75 90 105 
40 60 75 90 105 120 
 
1. Remember: if your husband put no Birr into the envelope, we add Birr [0.5Y] to 
the Birr [Y] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[1.5Y] in the common envelope.  
 
2. If your husband put Birr 10 into the envelope, we add Birr [read off first table] to 
the Birr [10 +Y] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[read off second table] in the common envelope.  
 
3. If your husband put Birr 20 into the envelope, we add Birr [read off first table] to 
the Birr [Y+ 20] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[read off second table] in the common envelope. 
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4. If your husband put Birr 30 into the envelope, we add Birr [read off first table] to 
the Birr [Y+30] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[read off second table] in the common envelope. 
 
5. If your husband put Birr 40 into the envelope, we add Birr [read off first table] to 
the Birr [Y+40] that are already in the common envelope. There will then be Birr 
[read off second table] in the common envelope. 
 
[STEP 6: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY –“Making the decision 2”] 
 
You now have to decide how to split the money for each of these possibilities. You 
cannot change your mind later on.  
 
1. If your husband put Birr 0 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off second 
table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How much 
for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & check 
sums]?  
 
2. If your husband put Birr 10 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off 
second table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How 
much for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & 
check sums]?  
 
3. If your husband put Birr 20 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off 
second table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How 
much for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & 
check sums]?  
 
4. If your husband put Birr 30 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off 
second table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How 
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much for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & 
check sums]?  
 
5. If your husband put Birr 40 into the envelope, so that there is Birr [read off 
second table] in the common envelope, how do you want to split the money? How 
much for you [write down]; and how much for your husband [Write down & 
check sums]?  
 
Is there any answer that you would like to change?  
 
[Review and change as is necessary] 
 
[STEP 7: To be read to EACH wife INDIVIDUALLY – Once the participant has taken 
the decision, conduct post-experiment questionnaire] 
 
1. If your husband had Birr 40 in his envelope, how much do you think he would take 
out? 
 
Thank you. We will now rejoin you and your husband and put the money from your two 
envelopes into the common envelope.  
 
[Bring husband and wife together & resolve the game.] 
 
[Experimenter looks up the allocation decision and executes it. Subjects are given their 
money and thanked] 
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[Instructions for husbands] 
 
[STEP 2: Husbands in a separate room – “Treatment Instructions” - To be read to ALL 
husbands at the same time] 
  
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact amount will vary 
between people, but you will receive something between Birr 0 and Birr 40. [Show the 
envelope.] Your wife will receive a similar envelope and she will also receive an amount 
of money between Birr 0 and Birr 40. She doesn’t know how much you have in your 
envelope and you won’t be told how much she has in her envelope.  
 
You have to decide how much money to take out of the envelope and how much to leave 
in. Any money you take out of the envelope is yours to keep. Your wife will be making 
the same decision with her envelope. You can only take nothing, Birr 10, Birr 20, Birr 30 
or Birr 40 out of the envelope. Other amounts are not allowed. So please remember: you 
can only take nothing, Birr 10, Birr 20, Birr 30 or Birr 40 out. 
 
After you have made your decision and your wife has made her decision we will bring 
you together again. We will put all the money that you and your wife have left in your 
envelopes into one envelope. We call it, the common envelope. To whatever is in the 
common envelope we will add another half again. So, if there are Birr 20 in the common 
envelope we will add another Birr 10 to make the total Birr 30. If there are Birr 80 in the 
common envelope we will add another Birr 40 to make a total of Birr 120 and so on.  
 
Both of you will know the total amount of money in the common envelope.  
 
After that your wife will decide how to split the money in the common envelope. She has 
to decide how much to give to you and how much to keep for herself. In a moment we 
will give you some time to think about how much money you want to leave in your 
envelope.  
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[STEP 3: To be read to EACH husband INDIVIDUALLY – “Control Questions”] 
 
Let me ask some questions to check whether you understood the instructions. 
1. If you have Birr 40 in your envelope and you take out Birr 20 how much will be 
left in the envelope? [record the answer, correct participant if necessary] 
2. If you put Birr 20 into the common envelope and your wife puts in Birr 20 how 
much will there be in total (before we add anything)? 
3. How much we will add if there is Birr 40 in the common envelope?  
 
[Record each answer, correct participant if necessary]16 
 
[STEP 4: To be read to EACH husband INDIVIDUALLY – “Decision Making” - Once 
the experimenter is sure that the participant has understood the activity, GIVE HIM THE 
ENVELOPE AND some time to make his decision IN PRIVATE. Don’t forget to write 
down the decision in the data entry sheet.] 
 
[STEP 5: To be read to EACH husband INDIVIDUALLY – Once the participant has 
taken the decision, conduct post-experiment questionnaire] 
 
1. If your wife had Birr 40 in her envelope, how much do you think she would take out? 
 
Thank you. We will now rejoin your wife and put the money from your two envelopes 
into the common envelope.  
 
[Resolution and payment as per above.] 
                                                 
16 [Responses to common questions: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE USED ONLY IN 
CASE PEOPLE ASK.]  
1. If you are asked whether the husband and wife will have the same amounts in their envelopes, 
answer: possibly, possibly not. 
2. If you are asked what ‘what should I do’, you should say that it is ‘your decision and I am not 
allowed to offer advice’ 
3. If you are asked precise arithmetical questions then answer them precisely. E.g if I put in Birr 40 
and my wife puts in nothing how much will you add to the total?’ Answer: Birr 20. 
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Table A1 
Regression analysis of spouses’ contribution behaviour (estimated using OLS) 
 Contribution of wife 
(fraction of endowment) 
Contribution of husband 
(fraction of endowment) 
Varanasi (VAR) .2537*** 
(.0669) 
.1930*** 
(.0728) 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) .0457 
(.0563) 
.1263 
(.0987) 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) .1029** 
(.0475) 
.0405 
(.0761) 
Addis Ababa (ADI) .1339** 
(.0531) 
.0391 
(.0779) 
Mehal Meda (MHM) .1620** 
(.0733) 
.0982 
(.0904) 
Hadiya (HAD) .2271** 
(.1005) 
.1320 
(.0796) 
Hausa (HAU) (omitted)   
Maguzawa (MAG) .1396 
(.1170) 
-.0830 
(.0674) 
VAR x “female control” (FC) -.1821** 
(.0708) 
-.1964*** 
(.0352) 
UPR x FC .0839 
(.0677) 
-.0223 
(.0753) 
TAM x FC -.0722 
(.0575) 
-.0769 
(.0741) 
ADI x FC -.0171 
(.0474) 
-.0397 
(.0557) 
MHM x FC -.2227*** 
(.0729) 
-.0180 
(.0652) 
HAD x FC -.1140 
(.1044) 
-.0955** 
(.0373) 
HAU x FC .0861** 
(.0356) 
-.1032 
(.0620) 
MAG x FC -.0716 
(.1143) 
.0486 
(.0484) 
VAR x “male control” (MC) -.0553 
(.1156) 
-.0763 
(.0829) 
UPR x MC .0566 
(.0650) 
-.0044 
(.1011) 
TAM x MC -.0808*** 
(.0220) 
-.0117 
(.0344) 
ADI x MC .0400 
(.0550) 
.0252 
(.0551) 
MHM x MC -.1341 
(.0938) 
-.0871 
(.0826) 
HAD x MC -.0751 
(.1660) 
-.0289 
(.0637) 
HAU x MC .0699 
(.0535) 
-.0046 
(.0859) 
MAG x MC -.0808 
(.0996) 
.0355 
(.0550) 
Female age in years .0020 
(.0014) 
-.0017 
(.0013) 
Male age in years -.0022* 
(.0012) 
.0012 
(.0011) 
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 Contribution of wife 
(fraction of endowment) 
Contribution of husband 
(fraction of endowment) 
Female education in years -.0014 
(.0026) 
.0042 
(.0027) 
Male education in years .0032 
(.0023) 
.0060** 
(.0026) 
Arranged marriage (=1) -.0196 
(.0255) 
-.0011 
(.0290) 
Times married (husband, #) -.0032 
(.0147) 
.0007 
(.0154) 
Wife is primarily home maker (=1) .0019 
(.0218) 
-.0042 
(.0171) 
Wife needs permission to buy dress/sari (=1) .0007 
(.0181) 
.0125 
(.0193) 
Wife primarily decides on spending 
household income (=1) 
.0239 
(.0352) 
.0503* 
(.0277) 
Wife expectations of husband withholding 
(fraction of endowments) 
-.2959*** 
(.0461) 
-.0152 
(.0385) 
Husband expectations of wife withholding 
(fraction of endowments) 
-.0789 
(.0533) 
-.3291*** 
(.0586) 
   
Constant .6284*** 
(.0705) 
.6259*** 
(.0760) 
R-squared .1792 .2112 
N 847 847 
Notes: Estimated using OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and clustered at the session 
level. *** indicates significant at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% level. The lower N than all 
participating couples reflect missing values for some of the control variables. 
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Table A2 
Regression analysis of spouses’ contribution behaviour (ordered probit) 
 Contribution of wife 
(fraction of endowment) 
Contribution of husband 
(fraction of endowment) 
Varanasi (VAR) 1.0409*** 
(.2959) 
.9047*** 
(.3351) 
Uttar Pradesh (UPR) .1799 
(.2507) 
.5861 
(.4608) 
Tamil Nadu (TAM) .4551** 
(.2185) 
.1950 
(.3414) 
Addis Ababa (ADI) .5917*** 
(.2281) 
.1880 
(.3448) 
Mehal Meda (MHM) .6933** 
(.3176) 
.4668 
(.4059) 
Hadiya (HAD)  .9841** 
(.4150) 
.6353* 
(.3562) 
Hausa (HAU) (omitted)   
Maguzawa (MAG) .5631 
(.5253) 
-.3691 
(.3052) 
VAR x “female control” (FC) -.7889*** 
(.2870) 
-.9051*** 
(.1627) 
UPR x FC .3816 
(.2854) 
-.1039 
(.3454) 
TAM x FC -.3508 
(.2579) 
-.3680 
(.3288) 
ADI x FC -.0706 
(.1856) 
-.1824 
(.2534) 
MHM x FC -1.0498*** 
(.3614) 
-.0814 
(.2961) 
HAD x FC -.4820 
(.4315) 
-.4426** 
(.1719) 
HAU x FC .3651** 
(.1781) 
-.4859* 
(.2776) 
MAG x FC -.2532 
(.5073) 
.2182 
(.2138) 
VAR x “male control” (MC) -.2267 
(.5311) 
-.3764 
(.3910) 
UPR x MC .2380 
(.2890) 
-.0035 
(.4774) 
TAM x MC -.3810*** 
(.0910) 
-.0600 
(.1482) 
ADI x MC .1300 
(.2261) 
.1286 
(.2611) 
MHM x MC -.5999 
(.4203) 
-.4200 
(.3769) 
HAD x MC -.3792 
(.7469) 
-.1492 
(.2904) 
HAU x MC .3421 
(.2443) 
-.0231 
(.3965) 
MAG x MC -.3270 
(.4716) 
.1427 
(.2524) 
Female age in years .0093 
(.0066) 
-.0078 
(.0059) 
Male age in years -.0101* 
(.0053) 
.0059 
(.0051) 
Female education in years -.0053 .0200 
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 Contribution of wife 
(fraction of endowment) 
Contribution of husband 
(fraction of endowment) 
(.0122) (.0125) 
Male education in years .0129 
(.0102) 
.0269** 
(.0121) 
Arranged marriage (=1) -.0783 
(.1094) 
-.0074 
(.1316) 
Times married (husband, #) -.0231 
(.0645) 
.0017 
(.0702) 
Wife is primarily home maker (=1) .0077 
(.0967) 
-.0260 
(.0797) 
Wife needs permission to buy dress/sari (=1) .0033 
(.0804) 
.0561 
(.0898) 
Wife primarily decides on spending 
household income (=1) 
.1215 
(.1594) 
.2364* 
(.1251) 
Wife expectations of husband withholding 
(fraction of endowments) 
-1.3910*** 
(.2287) 
-.0919 
(.1748) 
Husband expectations of wife withholding 
(fraction of endowments) 
-.3340 
(.2349) 
-1.5662*** 
(.2992) 
   
Pseudo R-squared .0696 .0835 
N 847 847 
Notes: Ordered probit model estimated using maximum likelihood. Standard errors are in parentheses and 
are robust and clustered at the session level. *** indicates significant at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 
10% level. The lower N than all participating couples reflect missing values for some of the control 
variables. 
 
 
 
